Virtue ethics stands as a prominent ethical framework, diverging from duty-based (deontology) and consequence-based (consequentialism) approaches. Instead of focusing on rules or outcomes, virtue ethics emphasizes the significance of character and virtues in shaping moral actions. A virtue ethicist might advise, “In this situation, act as a virtuous person would.”
Drawing heavily from Aristotle’s philosophy, virtue ethics posits that a virtuous individual embodies ideal character traits. These traits, while rooted in natural inclinations, require cultivation and, once developed, become enduring aspects of one’s character. Kindness, for example, becomes a stable characteristic of a virtuous person, guiding their actions across various situations throughout life, not merely a means to maximize happiness, gain favor, or fulfill obligations. Unlike deontological and consequentialist theories that seek universal principles for every moral dilemma, virtue ethics grapples with broader existential questions: “How should we live?”, “What constitutes a good life?”, and “What values should underpin our families and societies?”
Since its resurgence in the 20th century, virtue ethics has evolved along three primary paths: Eudaimonism, agent-based theories, and the ethics of care. Eudaimonism grounds virtues in human flourishing (eudaimonia), equating it with excelling in one’s unique function. Aristotle argued that human reason is our distinctive function, thus a fulfilling life is one lived in accordance with reason. Agent-based theories, conversely, define virtues based on our intuitive admiration for certain traits in others. The ethics of care, largely championed by feminist thinkers, challenges the traditional ethical focus on justice and autonomy, advocating for the inclusion of “feminine” virtues like care and nurturing.
However, virtue ethics faces criticisms. Some argue it is self-centered, prioritizing personal flourishing over the impact of actions on others. Another critique points to its lack of clear action guidance, offering no concrete principles beyond emulating virtuous individuals. Finally, the development of virtue is susceptible to external factors like education and social environment, raising questions about fairness in praise and blame if moral character is shaped by luck.
This article will explore virtue ethics by: examining its emergence as a distinct alternative to deontology and consequentialism; addressing common objections; and surveying prominent contemporary virtue ethics theories.
1. Reshaping Modern Moral Philosophy
a. Anscombe’s Challenge
In her seminal 1958 paper, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” G.E.M. Anscombe ignited a shift in normative ethics. She critiqued modern moral philosophy’s overemphasis on a “law conception of ethics,” which centers solely on obligation and duty. Anscombe specifically targeted utilitarianism (e.g., J.S. Mill) and deontology (e.g., Kant) for their reliance on universal principles – Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle and Kant’s Categorical Imperative – intended for all moral situations. This approach, she argued, led to rigid moral codes grounded in a concept of obligation that loses meaning in a secular world, as it implicitly requires a lawgiver – an assumption no longer universally accepted.
Anscombe advocated for a return to Aristotelian concepts: character, virtue, and flourishing. She also stressed the importance of emotions and moral psychology. Philosophers largely embraced Anscombe’s call to re-center virtue in moral understanding, leading to the development of virtue ethics as we know it today.
Anscombe’s confrontational style set the stage for early virtue ethics. Its proponents initially defined it by contrasting it with, and distinguishing it from, the perceived flaws of existing normative theories. Before delving deeper, it’s crucial to consider the contributions of Bernard Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre, whose advocacy for virtue theories further propelled this philosophical shift.
b. Williams: Beyond “Morality” to “Ethics”
Bernard Williams consistently highlighted overlooked yet philosophically rich areas. He critiqued the prevailing direction of moral philosophy, distinguishing between “morality” and “ethics.” “Morality,” in Williams’ view, is dominated by Kantian notions of duty and obligation, crucially linked to blame. Blame is justified when individuals, capable of acting rightly, fail to meet their obligations.
Williams also worried that this “morality” framework discounts luck. If morality is solely about obligation, it neglects factors beyond our control that influence a good life.
Williams proposed a broader concept, “ethics,” rejecting the narrowness of “morality.” “Ethics” accommodates a wider spectrum of emotions deemed irrelevant by “morality.” Ethical considerations extend to friends, family, and societal concerns, encompassing ideals like social justice. This aligns with the ancient Greek understanding of the good life found in Aristotle and Plato.
c. MacIntyre: Virtue and Tradition
Alasdair MacIntyre further fueled the growing interest in virtue. While sharing Anscombe and Williams’ skepticism towards concepts like “ought,” MacIntyre aimed to construct a positive account of virtue. He observed diverse historical understandings of virtue, varying in their lists and underlying theories. MacIntyre attributed these variations to different social “practices” shaping distinct virtue conceptions. Understanding any virtue account, he argued, requires understanding its social and moral context, as Homeric virtue is embedded in its Greek societal role. Virtues are enacted within coherent social activities (“practices”) aimed at realizing internal goods, and virtues enable us to achieve these goods. Transcending specific practices is an overarching telos – the good of an entire human life – embodied by the virtue of integrity or constancy.
These three thinkers, each in their way, advocated for a fundamental rethinking of morality. Whether emphasizing a shift from obligation, a broader ethical understanding, or a tradition of practices generating virtues, their dissatisfaction with modern moral philosophy paved the way for virtue ethics.
2. Virtue Ethics as a Rival to Deontology and Utilitarianism
Virtue ethics, though multifaceted, initially gained traction by distinguishing itself from deontology and consequentialism. This section explores the initial claims positioning virtue ethics as a distinct alternative.
a. “How Should One Live?” vs. “What is the Right Action?”
While all moral theories address right and wrong behavior and have practical implications, virtue ethics reframes the central ethical question. Deontology and consequentialism focus on “What is the right action?” Virtue ethics shifts to “How should I live? What kind of person should I be?” The former addresses specific dilemmas, the latter concerns a whole life. Virtue ethics asks not just about immediate right action, but about the character needed to consistently act rightly.
Deontology and consequentialism rely on rules for determining right action. Virtue ethics, however, centers on character. The answer to “How should one live?” becomes: live virtuously, cultivate a virtuous character.
b. Character and Virtue: Being and Doing
Modern virtue ethics draws inspiration from Aristotle’s concepts of character and virtue. Aristotelian character is fundamentally about being – possessing appropriate inner states. Kindness, for instance, involves specific emotions and internal dispositions towards others. Character is also about doing; virtuous inner states naturally lead to virtuous actions. Recognizing kindness as appropriate and feeling kindly inclined motivates one to act kindly.
A defining feature of virtue ethics is the stability and reliability of character traits. A kind person acts kindly in diverse situations, towards various people, consistently over time, even when challenging. Character ensures consistent action over time.
Moral character develops gradually. We are born with predispositions, some positive (placid nature), some negative (irascibility). These tendencies are shaped – nurtured or thwarted – by upbringing. Factors like parents, teachers, peers, role models, encouragement, and experiences all influence character development. Natural tendencies are raw material shaped by education and habituation.
Moral education is crucial in virtue ethics. Early moral learning relies on role models. Virtuous individuals serve as exemplars, and learners emulate them, initially through habituation in right action. Aristotle advised performing just acts to become just. Habituation is a tool, not virtue itself. True virtue requires choice, understanding, and knowledge. The virtuous agent acts not from unthinking habit, but from recognizing virtue’s value and appropriateness, choosing it knowingly for its own sake.
Moral character development is lifelong. Once established, it leads to consistent, predictable, and fitting actions in various situations.
Aristotle defined virtue in Nicomachean Ethics as “a purposive disposition, lying in a mean and being determined by the right reason.” Virtue is a settled disposition, chosen knowingly and intentionally. Acting kindly accidentally or unthinkingly isn’t virtuous; virtue requires recognizing and choosing virtuous action. Habituation aids development but isn’t equivalent to virtue; conscious choice and affirmation are needed.
Virtue “lies in a mean” because the right response is never excessive nor deficient, but appropriate to the situation and person. Virtues relate to feelings: courage to fear, modesty to shame, friendliness to social feelings. Virtue is the “mean” amount of emotion – appropriate, not necessarily moderate. Righteous anger, for instance, might be intense but appropriate. The “mean” is context-sensitive.
Finally, virtue is “determined by the right reason.” It requires both right desire and right reason. Wrong reasons lead to vice. One might aim for right reason but fail due to wrong desires. The virtuous agent acts effortlessly, perceiving right reason, possessing harmonious desires, and embodying virtue that seamlessly translates to action, serving as an example to others.
This is a brief overview of complex Aristotelian ideas central to virtue ethics’ claim as a unique normative theory. Modern virtue ethicists build on character and virtue, emphasizing moral psychology (often lacking in deontology and consequentialism), and replacing problematic duty/obligation concepts with the richer notion of virtue. Virtue judgments assess whole lives, not isolated actions.
c. Anti-Theory and the Uncodifiability of Ethics
Aristotle cautioned in Nicomachean Ethics about ethics’ imprecision, a point virtue ethicists use to critique consequentialism and deontology. These theories, relying on single, universally applicable principles, fail to capture ethical complexity.
Moral problems are diverse: truth-telling to friends, exam cheating, abortion, saving lives, social activism. A single rule seems inadequate to solve them all. If ethical problems are varied, solutions shouldn’t stem from one rigid, exceptionless rule. The fluid nature of ethics resists inflexible answers. “How should I live?” cannot be answered by a single rule. At best, virtue ethics allows “rules of thumb” – generally true guidelines, not always appropriate responses.
The doctrine of the mean embodies this. Virtuous responses cannot be rule-bound. Virtue requires experience, sensitivity, perception, practical reasoning – developed over time. The “uncodifiability of ethics thesis” argues ethics is too diverse and imprecise for rigid codes. Moral theories must be flexible and context-sensitive. Some virtue ethicists embrace “anti-theory,” rejecting systematic attempts to codify ethics.
d. Conclusion
Virtue ethics emerged as a distinct alternative to deontology and consequentialism, fueled by dissatisfaction with duty/obligation and rigid moral rules. It emphasizes virtue and character to answer “How should I live? What kind of person should I be?” Consequentialism is outcome-based, deontology agent-based; virtue ethics is character-based.
3. Virtue Ethical Theories
After initially defining itself against other theories, virtue ethics developed into fully formed accounts. Primarily influenced by Aristotle, though also drawing from Plato, Stoics, Aquinas, Hume, and Nietzsche, Aristotelian virtue ethics remains dominant. Three main branches emerged: Eudaimonism, agent-based theories, and the ethics of care.
a. Eudaimonism: Flourishing as the Goal
Eudaimonia, Aristotelian “happiness” (though inadequately translated), is central to eudaimonistic virtue ethics, rooted in Aristotle’s function argument. Actions are purposeful, aiming at goods. Vaccination aims at health; tennis practice aims at winning. Some actions are ends in themselves, others means to further ends. Aristotle argues all ends-in-themselves contribute to a supreme end: eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is happiness, fulfillment, the best life – both an end in itself and a means to living well.
Aristotle states that for anything with a function, its good lies in performing that function well. A knife’s function is cutting; a good knife cuts well. Applied to humans: humans have a function, and a good human performs their function well. Humanity’s unique function, distinguishing us, is reason. Thus, the human function is reason, and a distinctively human life is one lived according to reason. The good human, then, reasons well, living a life of excellence or eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the life of virtue – activity in accordance with reason, humanity’s highest function.
Eudaimonistic virtue ethics reverses the virtue-rightness relationship. Utilitarians might value kindness for its utility-maximizing consequences. Eudaimonism, however, justifies virtues as constitutive elements of eudaimonia (human flourishing), which is intrinsically good.
Rosalind Hursthouse developed a detailed eudaimonist account, arguing virtues make their possessor a good human being. All living things are evaluated as specimens of their kind. Humans, uniquely rational, act rationally by nature, enabling decision-making, character change, and responsibility. Virtuous action – acting rationally – aligns with human nature and leads to eudaimonia. Virtues benefit their possessor. Morality, often seen as conflicting with self-interest, is re-envisioned: human nature is such that virtue aligns with self-interest, being essential for human flourishing. The virtuous life is the good life, making virtue self-rewarding through the exercise of rational capacities.
However, diverse eudaimonistic interpretations exist. Philippa Foot grounds virtues in what benefits humans and communities, similar to MacIntyre’s view of virtues enabling goods within practices. Virtues contribute to, but are not necessarily constitutive of, the good life.
Perfectionists like Thomas Hurka derive virtues from traits that fully develop essential human properties, judged against an ideal of human perfection. Virtues realize our rationality, contributing to well-being and perfection.
b. Agent-Based Virtue Ethics: Admirable Traits
Not all virtue ethics is eudaimonistic. Michael Slote developed agent-based virtue ethics, grounded in common-sense intuitions about admirable character traits. He distinguishes agent-focused (Aristotelian, virtues as inner dispositions shaping virtuous individuals) from agent-based theories. Agent-based theories radically evaluate actions based on ethical judgments about the agent’s inner life. Traits like benevolence, kindness, and compassion are identified by observing admired individuals, our moral exemplars.
c. The Ethics of Care: Valuing “Feminine” Virtues
The Ethics of Care, primarily developed by feminist thinkers like Annette Baier, offers another influential virtue ethics perspective. It argues that traditional ethics, often framed in “masculine” terms of justice and autonomy, overlooks “feminine” virtues like care, nurturing, patience, and self-sacrifice. These virtues, often undervalued in society, are central to the ethics of care, advocating for a re-evaluation of morality to include these traditionally marginalized perspectives and virtues associated with women’s experiences. While not always explicitly linked to virtue ethics, the ethics of care significantly emphasizes specific virtues, their connection to social practices, and moral education, aligning with core themes of virtue ethics.
d. Conclusion: A Diverse Landscape
Virtue ethics is diverse. Eudaimonism, agent-based theories, and the ethics of care represent key strands, but many other theories exist. Christine Swanton, for instance, developed a pluralist virtue ethics drawing from Nietzsche, emphasizing inner self and moral psychology. Swanton’s work explores self-love, distinguishing true virtue from related vices (e.g., self-confidence vs. vanity), and uses Nietzschean creativity and expression to understand virtue acknowledgement.
Historically, virtue conceptions varied widely. Homeric virtue was socially defined, with excellence judged within society and accountability tied to social roles. Worth was comparative and competition central.
Christian thinkers like Aquinas and Augustine offer different virtue accounts (e.g., David Oderberg’s work). Aquinas emphasizes will, directed by virtues and natural law, grasped through practical judgment. Virtue involves both will to apply it and knowledge of application. Recognizing human susceptibility to evil, Aquinas includes faith, hope, and charity – virtues of love distinct from Aristotelian virtues.
Theories evolve and respond to criticism. Michael Slote moved from agent-based to Humean sentimentalist virtue ethics, emphasizing benevolence and evaluating actions by expressed sentiments. Admirable sentiments reflect concern for humanity. Further exploration of these diverse thinkers is encouraged for a deeper understanding.
4. Objections to Virtue Ethics
Much of virtue ethics development involves responding to criticisms. This section presents three common objections and potential responses.
a. Self-Centeredness?
Morality is often understood as other-regarding, concerned with actions’ impact on others. Moral praise/blame is based on our behavior towards others and our demonstrated concern for their well-being. Virtue ethics, critics argue, is self-centered, primarily focused on the agent’s character and their own flourishing. Aiming for compassion, kindness, and honesty merely for personal happiness seems morally problematic.
Relatedly, some critique the idea of well-being as a master value, with everything else valuable only insofar as it contributes to it. Tim Scanlon, for example, questions well-being as a moral concept, viewing it as closer to self-interest and unsuitable for the role eudaimonists assign it.
However, this critique misunderstands the role of virtues. Virtues are other-regarding. Kindness concerns responding to others’ needs. Virtuous agents aim to develop character that appropriately addresses others’ needs. Kindness involves perceiving situations requiring kindness, reliably acting kindly, and expressing kindness aligned with kind desires. Eudaimonistic virtue ethics argues agent’s good and others’ good are not separate aims, but both result from virtuous action. Virtue ethics, rather than being self-centered, unifies moral demands and self-interest.
b. Lack of Action Guidance?
Moral philosophy addresses practical concerns – how to act. Virtue ethics critiques deontology and consequentialism for rigidity due to single rules/principles. However, these theories are action-guiding, offering clear direction via “rigid” rules. Virtue ethics, emphasizing ethical imprecision, seems to lack practical guidance. A non-action-guiding moral theory is deemed inadequate.
The response emphasizes the virtuous agent as exemplar. Virtue ethics, while flexible and situation-sensitive, offers action guidance through observing virtuous examples. Virtuous agents, with fully developed moral character, act virtuously and know what to do by example. Virtue ethics stresses moral judgment development, a lifelong learning process offering clear answers only with moral maturity, not instant solutions from principles. Action guidance emerges from understanding the virtuous agent and the importance of moral education. Virtue, comprising right reason and desire, guides action when we perceive right reason and align desires with its commands.
c. Moral Luck?
A concern is that virtue ethics makes us vulnerable to moral luck. Morality involves responsibility, praise, and blame, typically for actions consciously chosen. Virtue development is challenging, influenced by factors outside our control. Positive influences promote virtue; negative ones vice. Some are lucky to receive needed support; others aren’t. If virtue/vice development is luck-dependent, is praising the virtuous and blaming the vicious fair if their character development was beyond their control? Furthermore, Aristotelian virtue relies on external goods like virtuous friendships, which are also luck-dependent.
Some theories (especially deontology) try to eliminate luck’s influence. Virtue ethics, however, embraces moral luck. Instead of seeking morality immune to external factors, it acknowledges the fragility of the good life as a moral feature. Vulnerability makes the good life precious. The possibility of losing virtue, due to life’s uncertainties, is an essential human condition, enhancing the value of achieving a good life.
5. Virtue in Deontology and Consequentialism
While offering a distinct alternative, virtue ethics has influenced deontology and consequentialism, prompting them to incorporate virtue insights.
Deontologists, initially focused on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, have re-examined works like Metaphysics of Morals and Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View to explore virtue’s role. Kantian virtue shares some similarities with Aristotelian virtue, emphasizing education, habituation, and gradual development to enhance theory plausibility. For Kantians, virtue aids in formulating appropriate maxims for testing. However, Kantian virtue differs: it is a struggle against emotions, valuing duty-driven motives over inclinations, unlike Aristotelian harmony. Kant rejects weakness of will (in the Aristotelian sense), focusing on fortitude and self-deception in failures of will. Kantians also grapple with reconciling virtue in the empirical world with Kant’s noumenal realm and moral worth.
Consequentialists incorporate virtue as a disposition promoting good consequences. Virtue is instrumentally valuable, not intrinsically so, for its utility-maximizing tendencies. Cultivating virtuous dispositions is seen as beneficial for maximizing utility, a departure from Aristotelian virtue valued for its own sake. Some consequentialists, like Driver, even argue knowledge is not necessary for virtue.
These rival theories have incorporated virtue ethics insights, leading to fruitful developments and responses to virtue ethics’ challenges, enriching the field of moral philosophy.
6. References and Further Reading
a. Changing Modern Moral Philosophy
- Anscombe, G.E. M., “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy, 33 (1958).
- MacIntyre, A., After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985).
- Murdoch, I., The Sovereignty of Good (London: Ark, 1985)
- Williams, B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985).
b. Overviews of Virtue Ethics
- Oakley, J., “Varieties of Virtue Ethics”, Ratio, vol. 9 (1996)
- Trianosky, G.V. “What is Virtue Ethics All About?” in Statman D., Virtue Ethics (Cambridge: Edinburgh University Press, 1997)
c. Varieties of Virtue Ethics
- Adkins, A.W.H., Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972).
- Baier, A., Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985)
- Blum, L.W., Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: 1980)
- Cottingham, J., “Partiality and the Virtues”, in Crisp R. and Slote M., How Should One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
- Cottingham, J., “Religion, Virtue and Ethical Culture”, Philosophy, 69 (1994)
- Cullity, G., “Aretaic Cognitivism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 4, (1995a).
- Cullit,y G., “Moral Character and the Iteration Problem”, Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 2, (1995b)
- Dent, N.J.H., “The Value of Courage”, Philosophy, vol. 56 (1981)
- Dent, N.J.H., “Virtues and Actions”, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 25 (1975)
- Dent, N.J.H., The Psychology of the Virtues (G.B.: Cambridge University Press, 1984)
- Driver, J., “Monkeying with Motives: Agent-based Virtue Ethics”, Utilitas, vol. 7, no. 2 (1995).
- Foot, P., Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).
- Foot, P., Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978).
- Hursthouse, R., “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20, (1991)
- Hursthouse, R., On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999).
- McDowell, J., “Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle”, in Lovibond S and Williams S.G., Essays for David Wiggins, Aristotelian Society Series, Vol.16 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)
- McDowel,l J., “Virtue and Reason”, The Monist, 62 (1979)
- Roberts, R.C., “Virtues and Rules”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LI, no. 2 (1991)
- Scanlon, T.M., What We Owe Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
- Slote, M., From Morality to Virtue (New York: OUP, 1992).
- Slote, M., Morals from Motives, (Oxford: OUP, 2001).
- Swanton, C., Virtue Ethics (New York: OUP, 2003).
- Walker, A.D.M., “Virtue and Character”, Philosophy, 64 (1989)
d. Collections on Virtue Ethics
- Crisp, R. and M. Slote, How Should One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
- Crisp, R. and M. Slote, Virtue Ethics (New York: OUP, 1997).
- Engstrom, S., and J. Whiting, Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics (USE: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Hursthouse, R., G. Lawrence and W. Quinn, Virtues and Reasons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
- Rorty, A.O., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (USA: University of California Press, 1980).
- Statman, D., Virtue Ethics (Cambridge: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).
e. Virtue and Moral Luck
- Andree, J., “Nagel, Williams and Moral Luck”, Analysis 43 (1983).
- Nussbaum, M., Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
- Nussbaum, M., The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
- Statman, D., Moral Luck (USA: State University of New York Press, 1993).
f. Virtue in Deontology and Consequentialism
- Baron, M.W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (USA: Cornell University Press, 1995).
- Baron, M.W., P. Pettit and M. Slote, Three Methods of Ethics (GB: Blackwell, 1997).
- Drive,r J., Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Herman, B., The Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
- Hooker, B., Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
- O’Neill, “Kant’s Virtues”, in Crisp R. and Slote M., How Should One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
- Sherman, N., The Fabric of Character (GB: Clarendon Press, 1989).
- Sherman, N., Making a Necessity of Virtue (USA: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Author Information
Nafsika Athanassoulis Email: [email protected] Keele University United Kingdom
